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SOME ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
PAUL EDWARD THURLOW*
3 HE Federal Government from its inception has been in
the position of a contractor, but the law regarding its
relationship as such, though slow in development, is now pro-
ceeding with accelerated tempo. When the government steps
down from its position as a sovereign power and takes upon
itself the legal position of an ordinary private citizen enter-
ing into contracts, it is, and should be, in general bound by
the same laws that govern contracts entered into between in-
dividuals.1 If the government is to buy and sell, construct,
hire, purchase, condemn, procure, or take part in business
activities, it should place itself in a position where damages
may be claimed against it. It was not until 1855, however,
that the Court of Claims was established to deal with such
problems, and the original law thereof had to be subsequently
amended by the Tucker Act.
2
While the government, as a contracting party, is subject
to the general rules of law relating to contracts, there are
exceptions to this general proposition. For example, the stat-
ute of limitations does not run against the government, nor
may its position be jeopardized by the laches of its officers
and agents. Failure on the part of the government to plead
the statute of limitations cannot confer jurisdiction on a
court; I when proceeding as a litigant it is not estopped by its
acts as a sovereign power;4 nor is it bound by those acts of
its agents which are detrimental to its own interests. Courts
have frequently adopted a principle, analogous to that con-
trolling a guardian and ward, that the government, by reason
of the fact that it can act only through its agents, is to be
treated as a ward. Its agents are, therefore, placed in the
position of guardians, and they are not permitted to take
* Member of the Illinois Bar.
1 Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 23 L. Ed. 237 (1875).
2 R. S. § 1059; 36 Stat. 1137; 28 U.S.C.A. § 250.
3 American Ship Fittings Corp. v. United States, 70 Ct. CI. 679 (1930).
4 Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 45 S. Ct. 344, 69 L. Ed. 736 (1925);
United States v. Warren Transp. Co., 7 F. (2d) 161 (1925).
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any action which would be detrimental to the position of the
ward and thereby bind it. As was aptly said in Garman, Ad-
ministrator v. United States:
This court has always regarded the Government as somewhat in the
character of a ward, and its officers in the character of its guardians, and
it has never given effect to a contract where it appeared that the con-
tractor has directly or indirectly, by direct bribes or corrupt influences,
sought to impair the good faith of the guardian. The corrupt purchase of
political or personal influence is more insidious, and in its result as bad
as direct bribery. Whoever has business dealings with a trustee, a guar-
dian, an executor, or officers of the Government can sway them by no
influence which will be prejudicial to the interests of the cestui que
trust.5
Persons negotiating contracts with the government must,
therefore, approach the task with this fundamental require-
ment in mind.
LIMITATIONS ON THE AGENT'S AUTHORITY
It is equally well settled that no officer can bind the gov-
ernment when he acts outside the scope of his authority.6 An
individual seeking to do business with the government is
bound to know the extent of the authority of its representa-
tive.7 One common limitation is that no expenditure from
government funds, except in a few categories, may be made
beyond the fiscal year, and no officer in signing a contract has
power to bind the government to pay more money than the
amount which has been appropriated for the contract.' There
5 34 Ct. Cl. 237 at 242 (1899). See also Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co.
v. United States, 273 U.S. 456, 47 S. Ct. 416, 71 L. Ed. 734 (1927); Crocker v. United
States, 240 U.S. 74, 36 S. Ct. 245, 60 L. Ed. 533 (1916); United States v. Carter,
217 U.S. 286, 30 S. Ct. 515, 54 L. Ed. 769 (1910); City of Findlay v. Pertz, 66 F.
427 (1895). x.:_1 J
6 In Whiteside v. United States, 93 U.S. 247 at 257, 23 L. Ed. 882 at 885 (1876),
the court said: ". . . it is better that an individual should occasionally suffer
from the mistakes of public officers or agents, than to adopt a rule which, through
improper combinations, or collusion, might be turned to the detriment and injury
of the public."
7 Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 584 (1934).
8 R. S. § 3679; 33 Stat. 1257, as amended by 34 Stat. 48; 31 U.S.C.A. § 665 reads
in part: "No executive department or other Government establishment of the
United States shall expend, in any one fiscal year, any sum in excess of appro-
priations made by Congress for that fiscal year, or involve the Government in
any contract or other obligation for the future payment of money in excess of
such appropriations unless such contract or obligation is authorized by law."
R. S. § 3732; 34 Stat. 255; 41 U.S.C.A. § 11, also reads: "No contract or purchase
301
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are instances, however, in which contracts may be made
even though no money has been appropriated to pay the con-
tractor, as in instances where Congress has passed special
legislation authorizing the making thereof. Clearly, in all
such cases, the government agent possesses the authority,
but if the act limits the amount of money that the contractor
shall receive, the government is not bound to pay more than
that sum.' Conversely, whenever an appropriation act has
been passed, there is implied authority to enter into a con-
tract in order to carry out the purposes for which the money
was appropriated. 10 It should also be borne in mind that
when a contract comes to an end by reason of the termina-
tion of the fiscal year, or when the funds to pay the contractor
have been exhausted, the contract cannot be modified to
carry it on into a subsequent year, nor can an additional
appropriation be made; but a new contract must be entered
into."
Furthermore, a federal statute provides in part: "Nor
shall any department nor any officer of the Government ac-
cept voluntary service for the Government or employ per-
sonal service in excess of that authorized by law, except in
cases of sudden emergency involving the loss of human life
or the destruction of property."'1 2 By reason thereof, it has
been the well-settled policy of the government not to accept
gratuitous services. Since many instances have arisen during
the last two years in which it has been to the advantage of the
contractor to render gratuitous service, the Army Service
Forces have been forced to issue the following ruling: "No
department or officer of the Government may accept volun-
tary service for the government except . . . when a written
statement is obtained that the service rendered will not be
on behalf of the United States shall be made, unless the same is authorized by
law or is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment, except in the War
and Navy Departments, for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, trans-
portation, or medical and hospital supplies, which, however, shall not exceed the
necessities of the current year."
9 Curtis v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 144 (1866).
10 Shipman v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 138 (1883).
11 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 287, 48 S. Ct. 306,
72 L. Ed. 575 (1928); Leiter v. United States, 271 U.S. 204, 46 S. Ct. 477, 70 L. Ed.
906 (1926).
12 R. S. § 3679; 33 Stat. 1257, as amended by 34 Stat. 48; 31 U.S.C.A. § 665.
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made the basis of a future claim against the Government for
compensation. "13
ADVERTISING FOR BIDS
Another important aspect of the law concerning govern-
ment contracts which must be considered is that dealing with
advertising for and soliciting of bids. The provisions of the
First War Powers Act of 1941,1 empowered the President to
authorize agents of the government to enter into contracts
without regard to statutory requirements as to advertising.
By the provisions of Executive Order No. 9001 dated De-
cember 27, 1941, the President has, in turn, authorized the
War Department to negotiate contracts without such prelimi-
nary advertising for bids. Since then, the War Production
Board has also generally prohibited the letting of contracts
by advertising and competitive bidding. However, due to the
fact that the provisions of Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes
are still applicable to contracts not having to do with the
prosecution of the war,' it would be well to bear such statute
in mind as well as the decisions thereunder. At the same
time, it should be remembered that another statute requires
advertising for the purchase of supplies for the Army, except
in cases of emergency. 16 These provisions are for the sole
benefit and protection of the government and cannot be
pleaded by the contractor. 7 Any contract which comes within
such statutes and is entered into in violation thereof is void.18
There is no set standard of advertising as to quantity,
number of prospective bidders contacted, or sufficiency of
advertising, but it seems that any advertising that meets the
particular circumstances will be deemed sufficient. A former
Attorney General set forth a general formula to be used to
test the adequacy of the advertising when he wrote:
13 Procurement Regulations, § 109.1.
14 Act of Dec. 18, 1941, Public Law 354, 77th Congress; 55 Stat. 839; 50 U.S.C.A.
§611.
15 R. S. § 3709; 36 Stat. 861; 41 U.S.C.A. §5.
16 31 Stat. 905; 10 U.S.C.A. § 1201; Act of March 2, 1901, Ch. 803.
17 American Smelting & Refining Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 75, 42 S. Ct.
420, 66 L. Ed. 833 (1922).
18 United States v. Speed, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 77, 19 L. Ed. 449 (1869); Schneider
v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 547 (1884).
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While there is no express provision as to the persons with whom the
Postmaster-General shall contract or to whom he shall by advertisement
address his proposals, he is justified in doing so to those who are able to
do the work or furnish the supplies which he needs in his Department.
In such a matter he will exercise his own discretion as to that which
shall be for the best interests of the public, and will carry out the policy
of the statute by thus limiting his advertisements when he shall deem it
expedient so to do. If, knowing the articles needed and knowing that they
can only be supplied by particular classes of persons, he sees fit to limit
his advertisement to them, he may properly do so. Contracts thus made
will not ordinarily be the subject of traffic or of transfer, but will be
performed by those with whom they are made. 19
By way of interpreting the words "personal services" as
used in the statute, it has been suggested that the personal
services must be such as could only be rendered by the con-
tractor himself, so that he thereby becomes a servant of the
government2 ° and not the employer of persons to carry out
the terms of the contract for him.2 As to just what consti-
,tutes a "public exigency" within the meaning thereof is not
entirely clear, as neither the courts nor the Attorney General
nor the Comptroller General have laid down any precise defi-
nition. All the reader can do is to consult the few cases which
have attempted an interpretation of such phrase.22
Obviously advertising for bids is not required in situa-
tions where there is only one source of supply; where the
service is to be rendered by a public utility; or where the
price is fixed by statute. Similarly, where a patent is pur-
chased or rights thereunder are obtained by contract, there
need be no advertising as there can be no competition.2 1 Con-
tracts involving small purchases and the like may often be
completed without the solicitation of bids. In that regard it
19 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 226 at 227 (1877).
20 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 235 (1877).
21 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 538 (1876).
22 United States v. Belridge Oil Co., 13 F. (2d) 562 (1926), cert. den. 273 U.S.
733, 47 S. Ct. 242, 71 L. Ed. 864 (1926); United States v. Speed, 75 U.S. (8 WalL)
77, 19 L. Ed. 449 (1869); Good Roads Machinery Co. v. United States, 19 F. Supp.
652 (1937); Ceballos v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 318 (1907); Moran Bros. Co. v.
United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 486 (1904); Pacific Steam Whaling Co. v. United States,
36 Ct. Cl. 105 (1901); Wentworth v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 302 (1869); Brady v.
United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 203 (1867). See also 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 384; 15 Op. Atty.
Gen. 253; 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 28; 14 Comp. Gen'l 875; and 14 Comp. Gen'l 364.
23 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 84 (1881).
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may be noticed that the following departments, offices, and
agencies of the government may let contracts up to the follow-
ing amounts without advertising and competitive bidding:
DEPARTMENT MAXIMUM AMOUNT
American Battle Monuments Commission ....................... $500.00
Botanic Garden (for supplies and equipment) .................... 50.00
Botanic Garden (for plants, trees, and shrubs) ................... 300.00
Bureau of the Budget (for office equipment) ..................... 50.00
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce ..................... 100.00
Bureau of Interparliamentary Union for Protection
of International Arbitration (for stenographic
reporting services) ...................................... As necessary
Departm ent of Interior ........................................... 100.00
Department of State (acting in the United States) ................ 100.00
Department of State (acting outside of the United States) ......... 300.00
Federal Communications Commission ............................ 25.00
The International Committee of Aerial Legal
Experts (for stenographic and other services) ............ As necessary
Medical Department of the Army (for medicines
and medical supplies) .................................... As necessary
Social Security Board ............................................. 100.00
Bureau of M ines .................................................. 500.00
Bureau of Reclam ation ......... .................................. 300.00
Architect of the Capitol ........................................... 200.00
G eological Survey ................................................. 50.00
Further exceptions to the rule against contracting without
advertising for bids, except as to contracts having to do with
the prosecution of the war, are set out in Title 41, Section 6
of the United States Code.24
NECESSITY FOR A WRITTEN CONTRACT
Under ordinary circumstances all government contracts
must be in writing,' but, owing to the war situation, this re-
quirement was temporarily abrogated.26 Section 303 of the
Procurement Regulations, as amended May 28, 1943, how-
ever, reads: "Every purchase transaction except those
where payment is made coincidentally with receipt of sup-
24 See 54 Stat. 1109; 56 Stat. 347, 483, 493, 500, 505; 41 U.S.C.A. § 6.
25 R. S. § 3744; 40 Stat. 198; 41 U.S.C.A. § 16.
26 Public Law 276, Oct. 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 743.
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plies will be evidenced by a written contract." Existence of a
formal written contract is, therefore, desirable. Again, the
former of the statutes has been construed to be for the bene-
fit of the government, and cannot be pleaded by the con-
tractor. A leading decision by the late Justice Holmes in-
volving such statute, that of United States of America v.
New York & Porto Rico Steamship Company27 -contains the
following pertinent language:
By this section it is made the duty of the Secretaries of War, the Navy,
and the Interior to cause every contract made by their authority on
behalf of the government "to be reduced to writing, and signed by the
contracting parties with their names at the end thereof;" all the copies
and papers in relation to the same to be attached together by a ribbon
and seal, etc ...
The statute does not address itself in terms to the effect of the form upon
the liability of the parties, like the statute of frauds. Whatever effect it
has in that way is not a matter of interpretation in a strict sense, but is
implied. The extent of the implication is to be gathered from the purpose
of the section and such other considerations as may give us light . . .
It is called "An act to Prevent and Punish Fraud on the Part of Officers
Intrusted with Making of Contracts for the Government," and this was
recognized as the purpose in Clark v. United States, 95 U. S. 539, 24 L.
Ed. 518 [1877]. In that case some of the justices thought that the decision
went too far in treating the section as a statute of frauds even in favor
of the United States; and while it is established that a contract not com-
plying with the statute cannot be enforced against the government, it
never has been decided that such a contract cannot be enforced against
the other party. The prevailing opinion cannot be taken to signify that
the informal contract is illegal, since it went on to permit a recovery
upon the quantum valebat when the undertaking had been performed by
a claimant against the United States . ..Of course the statute does not
mean that its maker, the government, one of the ostensible parties, is
guilty of unlawful conduct, or that the other party is committing a wrong
in making preliminary arrangements, if later the Secretary of the Navy
does not do what the act makes it his duty to do. There is no principle of
mutuality applicable to a case like this, any more than there necessarily
is in a statute requiring a writing signed by the party sought to be
charged. The United States needs the publicity, form, regularity of re-
turns and affidavit in order to prevent possible frauds upon it by officers.
A private person needs no such protection against a written undertaking
signed by himself. The duty is imposed upon the officers of the govern-
ment, not upon him. We see no reason for extending the implication of
the act beyond the evil that it seeks to prevent. Even when a statute in
27 239 U.S. 88, 36 S. Ct. 41, 60 L. Ed. 161 (1915).
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
so many words declares a transaction void for want of certain forms, the
party for whose protection the requirement is made often may waive it,
"void" being held to mean only voidable at the party's choice.2 8
APPROVAL BY SENIOR OFFICIALS
Many government contracts must also be approved by a
higher officer before they can take effect. This is often true
where a directive has been issued containing the precise term
concerning which a contract is to be executed but it is later
discovered that these terms cannot be strictly met. In such
instances, the contracting officer will insert a statement in
the body of the contract that the same is subject to approval
of a certain higher officer, and is to possess no force and ef-
fect until so approved. The customary procedure in such
cases is for the higher official to indicate his approval upon
the face of the contract, but this method is not exclusive. In
the case of Tenney v. United States,29 for example, the court
held that, where the approval of a superior officer was re-
quired, the fact that the superior officer personally approved
the payment of vouchers under the contract constituted ap-
proval of the contract itself. In arriving at that result, the
court relied on Speed v. United States" and said: ". . . where
a contract provides that it shall be subject to the approval of
the Commissary-General, but does not prescribe any mode
by which the approval shall be evidenced, there being no rule
of law which prescribes any, it may be approved circum-
stantially. ' ' 31 In the Speed case, a contract was entered into
for the slaughtering of hogs and the packing of pork for the
Army, which required approval by the Commissary-General.
The contract did not state how such approval was to be indi-
cated, but the Court of Claims allowed a recovery since the
Commissary-General had written to the contracting officer
expressing satisfaction at the progress made under the
contract.
In the case of Monroe v. United States,32 however, a con-
tract was drafted containing the words: "This contract shall
28 239 U.S. 88 at 91, 36 S. Ct. 41, 60 L. Ed. 161 at 163.
29 10 Ct. CL 269 (1874).
30 2 Ct. C1. 429 (1866).
81 10 Ct. C1. 269 at 273.
32 184 U.S. 524, 22 S. Ct. 444, 46 L. Ed. 670 (1902).
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be subject to the approval of the Chief of Engineers, United
States Army." The form used was that furnished in advance
by the Chief of Engineers. After the contract had been
accepted by the contracting officer and the contractor had
made preparations to do the work, the United States, a few
days after the work was to have commenced, ordered all
work stopped and the contract abrogated. Suit for damages
was dismissed by the Court of Claims and an appeal was
taken. The Supreme Court, sustaining the holding of the
Court of Claims, said:
It is the final written instrument that the statute contemplates shall be
executed and signed by the parties, and which shall contain and be the
proof of their obligations and rights. And it was such written instrument
that was to be approved by the chief of engineers. The approval was to
be a future act ...The approval, therefore, did not consist of something
precedent, but was to consist of something subsequent. That which pre-
ceded was inducement only, and contemplated an instrument of binding
and remedial form, and hence to contain covenants imposing obligations
and giving rights and remedies, containing provisions . . . for changes
and extra work-indeed, of the provisions which prudence and necessity
require and those which the statutes of the United States might require.
And the final right to see that this was done, the parties agreed, should be
devolved upon the chief of engineers, and it was not satisfied by prior
instructions. In other words, a final reviewing and approving judgment
was given to the chief of engineers, and was given by a covenant so
expressed as to constitute a condition precedent to the taking effect of
the contract. If the covenant did not mean that, it was idle. Construed as
prospective, it had a natural purpose. The engagement of the parties did
not end with the bid and its acceptance. The performance of the work
was to be secured, and the final judgment of what was necessary for
that, as we have already said, was to be given by.the chief of engineers. 33
From these foregoing authorities, the rule may be deduced
that, when approval by a higher official is necessary, that
approval is a condition precedent and must be given in order
to give validity to the contract, but the form of the approval
is immaterial.
EXISTENCE OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT
Where no formal written contract exists, a question may
arise as to the possibility of finding an implied contract. In
that regard it may be noted that the law, as applied in govern-
3. 184 U.S. 524 at 527, 22 S. Ct. 444, 46 L. Ed. 670 at 672.
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mental situations, has had a long and tortuous history due
mainly to the fact that the United States is a sovereign power.
In Russell v. United States,4 it was stated that:
If the United States was a person, on the facts of this record (assuming,
of course, the petition to be true), it could be sued as upon an implied
contract, but it is the prerogative of a sovereign not to be sued at all
without its consent or upon such causes of action as it chooses. It has not
chosen to be sued in an action sounding in tort this court has declared, as
we have seen.
3 5
It may be noted, in passing, that the Russell case was decided
in 1900 and since then several statutes have been passed by
Congress allowing payment of claims even though they arise
out of tort. 86 In fact, as recently as July 3, 1943, further provi-
sion has been made to provide for the settlement of claims
for damage to or loss or destruction of property or personal
injury or death caused by military personnel or civilian em-
ployees, or otherwise incident to the activities of the War De-
partment or of the Army."7 It might also be pointed out that,
regardless of such statutes, the officers and agents of the
government have always been personally liable in tort actions
34 182 U.S. 516, 21 S. Ct. 899, 45 L. Ed. 1210 (1901).
35 182 U.S. 516 at 535, 21 S. Ct. 899, 45 L. Ed. 1210 at 1217.
36 37 Stat. 586, as amended by 42 Stat. 24; 5 U.S.C.A. § 208; 42 Stat. 1066; 31
U.S.C.A. § 215; 43 Stat. 907, as amended by 44 Stat. 269; 31 U.S.C.A. § 224; 55
Stat. 880; 31 U.S.C.A. § 224d, as amended by Public Law 39, April 22, 1943, 78th
Congress.
37 Public Law 112, 78th Congress, 1st Session, Ch. 189, § 1026, reads in part:
"That the Secretary of War, and, subject to appeal to the Secretary of War, such
other officer or officers as he may designate . . . are hereby authorized to con-
sider, ascertain, adjust, determine, settle and pay in amount not in excess of
$500.00, or in time of war not in excess of $1,000, where accepted by the claimant
in full satisfaction and final settlement, any claim against the United States
arising on or after May 27, 1941, when such claim is substantiated in such manner
as the Secretary of War may by regulation prescribe, for damage to or loss or
destruction of property, real or personal, or for personal injury or death, caused
by military personnel or civilian employees of the War Department or of the
Army while acting within the scope of their employment, or otherwise incident
to noncombat activities of the War Department or of the Army, including claims
... for damage to or loss or destruction of personal property bailed to the Govern-
ment and claims for damages under a lease, express or implied, or otherwise:
Provided, that the damage to or loss or destruction of property, or the personal
injury or death, shall not have been caused in whole or in part by any negligence
or wrongful act on the part of the claimant, his agent, or employee. . . The
provisions of this Act shall not be applicable to claims arising in foreign coun-
tries or possessions thereof . . . The Secretary of War may report such claims
as exceed $500, or in time of war $1,000, to Congress for its consideration."
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for any wrong committed to the property rights of persons,
even though that wrong be done pursuant to direction of the
United States. 8
By the express terms of the Tucker Act, the government
is subjected to liability on contracts implied in fact, 9 and
perhaps the leading case illustrative thereof is that of Clark
v. United States.4 In that case, an oral agreement had been
entered into between the claimant and an officer of the Quar-
termaster Department, with the approval of the Commanding
General, whereby the Quartermaster's Department should
have the use of the steamer "Belle" at the rate of $150.00 per
day on condition that if the steamer performed in a satisfac-
tory manner on a trial trip, a written agreement was to be
entered into. According to the terms of the oral agreement,
the boat was to be tested by agents of the government at gov-
ernment expense and, if she should be lost on the trial trip,
the government would reimburse the owner for the value of
the vessel. On the trial run, the "Belle" was wrecked and be-
came a total loss. The claim of the owner for the total value
of the vessel was resisted on the ground that the contract was
not in writing as required by the provisions of the existing
statute. In holding such statute to be mandatory and not
directory, the court said:
The facility with which the Government may be pillaged by the present-
ment of claims of the most extraordinary character, if allowed to be
sustained by parole evidence, which can always be produced to any
required extent, renders it highly desirable that all contracts which are
made the basis of demands against the Government should be in writing.
Perhaps the primary object of the statute was to impose a restraint upon
the officers themselves and prevent them from making reckless engage-
ments for the Government; but the considerations referred to make it
manifest that there is no class of cases in which a statute for preventing
frauds and perjuries is more needed than in this. And we think that the
statute in question was intended to operate as such. It makes it unlawful
for contracting officers to make contracts in any other way than by
writing signed by the parties. This is equivalent to prohibiting any other
mode of making contracts. Every man is supposed to know the law. A
38 See, for example, Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 16 S. Ct. 443, 40 L. Ed. 599
(1896).
39 Act of March 3, 1887, Ch. 359; 24 Stat. 505; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 41, 250, 251, 254,
257, 258, 287, 289, 292, and 761-5.
40 95 U.S. 539, 24 L. Ed. 518 (1877).
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party who makes a contract with an officer without having it reduced to
writing is knowingly accessory to a violation of duty on his part. Such a
party aids in the violation of the law.
41
The court did find, however, that there was an implied con-
tract of bailment for hire; that the bailee for hire was re-
sponsible only for ordinary diligence, and as negligence on
the part of the agents of the government was not shown, there
was no liability on the part of the government for the value
of the vessel. It did allow a recovery on a quantum meruit
basis for the value of the use of the vessel while in the hands
of the government.
In contrast thereto is the case of Crouch v. United
States42 in which a written contract was entered into by an
officer of the government for the rental of a pile driver. While
the pile driver was being used by the agents of the govern-
ment, acting within the scope of their authority, it was lost
in a severe storm. The court, addressing itself to the question
of jurisdiction, held that there was an implied obligation on
the part of the government to use due care, and that liability
for failure so to do could be enforced by suit under the
Tucker Act. In that regard, the court said:
There was undoubtedly a written contract entered into for the rental of
the pile driver by the officers of the government, who had authority to
make such a contract. The government was therefore a bailee for hire,
and under an implied obligation to use reasonable care in the use of the
property and for its preservation. If a bailee for hire is guilty of negli-
gence, and the property through such negligence is either lost or dam-
aged, he is liable to the bailor, not for a tort, strictly speaking, but upon
the implied obligation to use due care arising out of the contract. If the
contract had in express terms required the use of due care, the action
could hardly be said to be one sounding in tort. The fact that the obliga-
tion to use due care arises as an implied obligation from the contract
cannot change the situation. The suit, therefore, can be maintained under
the Tucker Act as a suit upon implied contract.
43
In cases where the United States has received the benefit
of a mechanism invented by an individual, the courts have
construed an implied contract to be in existence, so that it
may be safely asserted that where the government uses a
patented invention "with the consent and express permission
41 95 U.S. 539 at 541, 24 L. Ed. 518 at 519.
42 31 F. (2d) 211 (1928).
48 31 F. (2d) 211 at 212.
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of the owner" and does not "repudiate the title of such
owner," an implied contract to pay a reasonable compensa-
tion for such usage will arise." Similarly, as in Reeside v.
United States, 45 a recovery has been allowed on quantum
meruit, but denied on the theory of an implied contract,
where the agent of the government, illegally appointed and
lacking authority to act as such, has made purchases on be-
half of the government from which it received a benefit by
reason of the fact that the goods were accepted by a properly
appointed authority. 6 The government, however, has been
adamant on the point of denying that an implied contract
exists where an individual goes beyond the scope of his au-
thority and attempts to contract on behalf of the govern-
ment.47 The burden is, therefore, upon the contractor to as-
certain for himself the scope of the authority of the agent who
pretends to do business on behalf of the government. While,
at first blush, this might seem to be a hardship upon those
desiring to do business with the government, it must be re-
membered that greater hardship would prevail on the people
at large if any one, under pretext of proper authority, were
able to place the government in a position in which it would
have to pay out money for something wholly unauthorized.
44 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. United States, 53 Ct. C1. 348 (1918).
45 2 Ct. Ci. 1 (1866).
46 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 258 U.S. 321, 42 S. Ct. 334, 66 L. Ed.
639 (1922); United States v. Societe Anonyme, etc., Cail., 224 U.S. 309, 32 S. Ct.
479, 56 L. Ed. 778 (1912); United States v. Berdan Firearms Manf. Co., 156 U.S.
552, 15 S. Ct. 420, 39 L. Ed. 530 (1895).
47 United States v. Michigan, 190 U.S. 379, 23 S. Ct. 742, 47 L. Ed. 1103 (1903);
Pine River Logging & Improvement Co. v. United States, 186 U.S. 279. 22 S. Ct.
920, 46 L. Ed. 1164 (1902); Moses v. United States, 166 U.S. 571, 17 S. Ct. 682,
41 L. Ed. 1119 (1897); United States v. Dalles Military Road Co., 140 U.S. 599,
11 S. Ct. 988, 35 L. Ed. 560 (1891); United States v. Insley, 130 U.S. 263, 9 S. Ct.
485, 32 L. Ed. 968 (1889); Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 10 S. Ct. 134, 33
L. Ed. 393 (1889); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 8 S. Ct. 1083, 32 L. Ed.
121 (1888); Steele v. United States, 113 U.S. 128, 5 S. Ct. 396, 28 L. Ed. 952 (1885);
Moffat v. United States, 112 U.S. 24, 5 S. Ct. 10, 28 L. Ed. 623 (1884); Hart v.
United States, 95 U.S. 316, 24 L. Ed. 479 (1877); Whiteside v. United States, 93 U.S.
247, 23 L. Ed. 882 (1876); Filor v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 45, 19 L. Ed.
549 (1870); Pierce v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 19 L. Ed. 169 (1869);
Hunter v. United States, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 173, 8 L. Ed. 86 (1831); United States v.
Kirkpatrick, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 720, 6 L. Ed. 199 (1824); Lee v. Munroe and Thorn-
ton, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366, 3 L. Ed. 373 (1813); United States v. Riggins, 65 F.
(2d) 750 (1933); United States v. Carbon County Land Co., 46 F. (2d) 980 (1931);
United States v. Lee Wilson & Co., 214 F. 630 (1914); United States v. City of
Alexandria, 19 F. 609 (1882); State v. Brewer, 64 Ala. 287 (1879).
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
The court has, however, refused to allow a recovery
on a contract implied in law. In that regard the case of
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company v. United States48 is sig-
nificant. The facts therein are briefly these. In October, 1921,
a lease was signed with the government for the rental of
real estate in Ohio for a term of five years. No appropriation
was made beyond June 30, 1922. The lease provided that in
the event no appropriation was made available for occu-
pancy beyond that date, the lease would automatically ter-
minate. An appropriation was made for the fiscal year end-
ing June 30, 1923, and another for the following year. Prior
to June 30, 1923, the government notified the lessor that the
premises would not be occupied after that date, but the gov-
ernment failed to vacate the premises and remained until
December 20, 1923. Under the common law of Ohio, where
rent is reserved annually and the tenant holds over and
states that he does not intend to be bound for another year
but the landlord declares an opposite intention, the tenant is
held for the entire succeeding year. Despite such rule, the
court, in affirming the finding of the Court of Claims that
there was no cause of action, said:
The right here invoked to sue the United States under the Tucker Act on
a claim founded on contract-as this is-must rest upon the existence of
a contract express or implied in fact, no right of action being given by
the Act in cases where, if the transaction were between private parties,
recovery could be had upon a contract implied in law.49
The doctrine that a recovery may be had on a contract im-
plied in fact, but not upon one implied in law, may now be
regarded as well established."
MEASURE OF DAMAGE
Occasionally the government finds it necessary to
breach a valid contract, as in cases where the government
48 276 U.S. 287, 48 S. Ct. 306, 72 L: Ed. 575 (1928).
49 276 U.S. 287 at 293, 48 S. Ct. 306, 72 L. Ed. 575 at 579.
50 United States v. Minnesota Mut. Invest. Co., 271 U.S. 212, 46 S. Ct. 501, 70
L. Ed. 911 (1926); Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338, 45 S. Ct. 278, 69 L. Ed.
643 (1925); Klebe v. United States, 263 U.S. 188, 44 S. Ct. 58, 68 L. Ed. 244 (1923);
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 43 S. Ct. 425, 67 L. Ed.
816 (1923); John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138, 42 S. Ct. 58, 66
L. Ed. 171 (1921); Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575, 41 S. Ct. 563, 65 L. Ed.
1099 (1921); Ball Engineering Co. v. J. G. White & Co., 250 U.S. 46, 39 S. Ct 393,
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has contracted for the production of certain types of ma-
chines and improvements in design have rendered obsolete
the articles called for under the contract. Where no provi-
sion has been inserted in the contract covering such con-
tingency, the law is well settled as to the measure of dam-
ages to be recovered. In the case of United States v.
Behan5 that measure was fixed as the reasonable amount
of loss sustained by the injured party. In arriving at that
figure, two categories need be considered. The first involves
the amount of money the aggrieved party has expended in
preparing to perform the entire contract. The second repre-
sents the profits he would have realized had he been per-
mitted to perform the entire contract. These profits must
be determined from all the facts and circumstances of each
individual case, but they cannot be speculative or remote,
and must be clearly proved. The court, in Speed v. United
States,52 said such profits were "the difference between the
cost of doing the work and what claimants were to receive
for it, making reasonable reduction for the less time en-
gaged, and for release from the care, trouble, risk and re-
sponsibility attending a full execution of the contract." A
further statement of the rule may be found in Broadbent
Laundry Corporation v. United States53 where the court
said:
In arriving at the profits to which the plaintiff is entitled the court must
take into consideration the progress attained, the unfinished part of the
contract, the probable cost of completion, the whole contract price, the
estimated pecuniary result, favorable or unfavorable to it, had it been
permitted to go on and complete its contract ... The court will also take
into consideration the relief of the contractor from responsibility for a
large part of the contract, and for the time and trouble which a full
performance would have required and imposed upon it and the release
of contractor's plant for other work.
54
Of course, in all cases where the contract contains a termi-
nation clause providing for the payment to the contractor of
63 L. Ed. 835 (1919); Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121, 39 S. Ct. 56, 63 L. Ed.
162 (1918).
51 110 U.S. 338, 4 S. Ct. 81, 28 L. Ed. 168 (1884).
52 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 77, 19 L. Ed. 449 (1869).
53 56 Ct. Cl. 128 (1921).
54 56 Ct. Cl. 128 at 132.
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certain costs and profits, but not prospective profits, the lat-
ter cannot be recovered.
55
The First World War produced some interesting litiga-
tion concerning the cancellation of government contracts
pursuant to the authority of the Act of June 15, 1915, which
permitted the President to "modify, suspend, cancel, or req-
uisition any existing or future contracts for the building,
production, or purchase of ships or material."5 6 In the case
of Russell Motor Car Company v. United States," the com-
pany contracted with the United States to manufacture cer-
tain gun mounts, the last of which was to be delivered on
April 30, 1919. On November 18, 1918, the Navy Department
requested the manufacturer to decrease his production un-
der the contract, and on November 23, 1918, the contract
was cancelled. The court, addressing itself to the question
of the measure of damages, said:
It is contended, further, that even if the action of the Secretary of the
Navy was warranted by the statute, the Car Company was nevertheless
entitled to have included, as just compensation, its anticipated profits.
This contention confuses the measure of damages for breach of contract
with the rule of just compensation for the lawful taking of property by
the power of eminent domain. In fixing just compensation the court must
consider the value of the contract at the time of its cancellation, not
what it would have produced by way of profits for the Car Company, if
it had been fully performed.5 8
In similar situations, other courts have held that the loss
to the contractor was caused by the cessation of hostilities,
that the contractor knew of that contingency before he en-
tered into the contract, and took a chance on the date on
which an armistice might be signed. 59
A different situation arises in condemnation cases. Thus,
where a navigation company had placed a lock and a dam
in a river and held a franchise to collect tolls, which the
government seized to its own use, the court held that the
franchise to collect tolls was as much a vested right of the
55 Dorris Motor Car Co. v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 68 (1924).
56 Act of June 15, 1917, c. 29, 40 Stat. 182, repealed June 5, 1920, 41 Stat. 988.
57 261 U.S. 514, 43 S. Ct. 428, 67 L. Ed. 778 (1923).
58 261 U.S. 514 at 523, 43 S. Ct. 428, 67 L. Ed. 778 at 784.
59 Savage Arms Corporation v. United States, 57 Ct Cl. 71 (1922); Meyer Scale
& Hardware Co. v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 26 (1922).
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navigation company as was the ownership of the tangible
property, hence "just compensation required payment for
the franchise to take tolls, as well as for the value of the
tangible property." 6 The assertion by Congress of its pur-
pose to take the property was held not to destroy the state
franchise. While this was a condemnation proceeding rather
than one based on contract, it nevertheless indicates that the
court might allow a recovery of future profits which could
be determined to be a property right. Certainly, where pri-
vate property has been appropriated by the government
prior to formal proceedings, the courts have felt justified,
in order to do equity, in awarding a recovery of interest."
Since the passage of the First War Powers Act, attempts
have been made to standardize the business of contracting
with the government so that, despite the emergency of the
situation with its consequent urge to get into production
promptly forcing a sudden terrific expansion of war indus-
tries, equity might prevail between the government and the
contractors. In this spirit a standard form of "termination
for the convenience of the government" clause is inserted
in virtually all government contracts in order to protect both
the government and the private contractor. The present
text of such clause is printed in Appendix I hereto.
6 2 It
should go far in preventing litigation over the question of
the measure of damage in the event of cancellation before
completion.
TENDER OF PERFORMANCE
When dealing with problems of tender of performance,
the courts have taken the same attitude toward those con-
tracting with the government as they would take toward
purely private contractors. This attitude seems, however, to
have caused no small amount of dissatisfaction among liti-
gants who apparently feel that the United States, while a
sovereign, should be a benevolent one and not permit its
60 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 at 344, 13 S. Ct.
622, 37 L. Ed. 463 at 474 (1893).
61 Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 43 S. Ct. 354, 67
L. Ed. 664 (1923); United States v. Rogers, 257 F. 397 (1919).
62 See page 323, post.
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constituents to suffer loss. The court, in Smoot's Case," un-
burdened itself on this point by saying:
There is, in a large class of cases coming before us from the court of
claims, a constant and ever recurring attempt to apply to contracts made
by the government, and to give to its action under such contracts, a con-
struction and an effect quite different from those which courts of justice
are accustomed to apply to contracts between individuals. There arises,
in the minds of the parties and counsel interested for the individual,
against the United States a sense of the power and the resources of this
great government, prompting appeals to its magnanimity and gener-
osity, to abstract ideas of equity, coloring even the closest legal argu-
ment. These are addressed in vain to this court. Their proper theater is
the halls of Congress, for that branch of the government has limited the
jurisdiction of the court of claims to cases arising out of contracts express
or implied---contracts to which the United States is a party in the same
sense in which an individual might be, and to which the ordinary
principles of contracts must and should apply.
64
In that case, two contracts had been entered into between
Smoot and the government whereby the former was to de-
liver a certain number of horses. The contractor did not have
the horses at the time the contract was executed, but was
going to procure them for purpose of delivery. Before de-
livery could be made, the Bureau of Cavalry adopted a rul-
ing that when horses were delivered they should be held one
day for inspection, and, if rejected, should be branded with
the letter "R." After this ruling was passed, the contractor
could not procure horses with which to fulfill his contract
and he filed suit in the Court of Claims for the profits he
would have made. Addressing itself to the proposition of the
necessity of tender of performance, the court said:
We think it was equally his duty to have tendered horses at Chicago, and
if the new regulations would have relieved him at all from that duty, it
would have been after he had made a tender and objected to the appli-
cation of the new rule of inspection, and the proper officer had refused
to receive the horses without subjecting them to those rules. Until then
he could not justly claim that the government had violated its contract.
6 5
Where the government by its own acts makes performance
impossible, a recovery may, of course, be allowed without
tender of performance.6
63 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 36, 21 L. Ed. 107 (1873).
64 82 U.S. 36 at 45, 21 L. Ed. 107 at 110.
65 82 U.S. 36 at 50, 21 L. Ed. 107 at 111.




Naturally, in times like these, when the volume of con-
tracts made and completed, money paid, and suits filed,
reach staggering proportions, a great many compromises
are also being accomplished. The tendency on the part of the
government has been to close the cases as rapidly as possi-
ble consonant with fairness and equity, and where a set-
tlement has been made in good faith, the courts are loathe to
disturb it. Thus, in Trumbull Steel Co. v. United States,7 a
compromise settlement, under which the taxpayer paid a
sum of money in full settlement of interest on a tax in addi-
tion to that already paid, though paid after the statute of
limitations had barred the collection of the tax, was held
valid as being made in good faith. Likewise, in United States
v. Kraus,68 it was held that where the government had ac-
cepted the benefit of the act of its agent in making a settle-
ment of a claim for excess profits, and had retained the
money received by it thereunder, it could not repudiate
the authority of the agent to act for it.
In effecting compromises and settlements, if the sum of
money agreed upon is fixed by both parties in good faith
and with all the facts known, it will be binding and cannot
later be disturbed. If, however, a lesser amount is accepted
by the contractor than that originally claimed, the compro-
mise may be set aside and a greater amount allowed, unless
it can be affirmatively established that the contractor
freely and without duress accepted such a settlement. As the
court, in St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico Railway Company
v. United States,69 stated:
Acquiescence by the claimant in the payment by the government of a
smaller amount than is due will ordinarily effect the discharge. Acquies-
cence can be established by showing conduct before the payment which
might have led the government to believe that the amount allowed was
all that was claimed, or that such amount, if paid, would be received in
full satisfaction of the claim. Acquiescence can also be established by
showing conduct after payment which might have led the government to
believe that the amount actually received was accepted in full satis-
faction of the original claim. But to constitute acquiescence within the
67 76 Ct. C1. 391 (1932).
88 61 F. (2d) 886 (1932).
68 268 U.S. 169, 45 S. Ct. 472, 69 L. Ed. 899 (1925).
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meaning of this rule, something more than acceptance of the smaller
sum without protest must be shown. There must have been some conduct
on the part of the creditor akin to abandonment or waiver, or from which
an estoppel might arise. Every case in which this Court has sustained
the affirmative defense of acquiescence rests upon findings which include
at least one of these additional features.
70
The use of duress in affecting settlements has time and
again been productive of litigation. Just what acts will con-
stitute "duress" is a matter of some difficulty as the word
itself has not been clearly defined by the courts. Threatening
to cancel a present contract in order to arrive at a
settlement is apparently not sufficient, according to Harts-
vile Oil Mill v. United States,7 where the court said: ".
a threat to break a contract does not in itself constitute du-
ress. Before the coercive effect of the threatened action can
be inferred, there must be evidence of some probable con-
sequence of it to the person or property for which the remedy
afforded by the courts is inadequate." '72 In Swift and
Company v. United States, 7 however, the Supreme Court
said with reference to such a transaction:
The parties are not on equal terms. The appellant had no choice. The only
alternative was to submit to an illegal exaction or discontinue its busi-
ness. It was in the power of the officers of the law, and could only do as
they required. Money paid or other value parted with, under such pres-
sure, has never been regarded as a voluntary act within the meaning of
the maxim, volenti non fit injuria."
74
The opinion in the case of Hazelhurst Oil Mill & Fertilizer
Co. v. United States75 presents a goodly collection of other
cases bearing on this point.
70 268 U.S. 169 at 174, 45 S. Ct 472, 69 L. Ed. 899 at 902. See also Louisville &
N. R. Co. v. United States, 267 U.S. 395, 45 S. Ct. 233, 69 L. Ed. 678 (1925); New
York, New Haven & H. R. Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 32, 42 S. Ct. 209, 66 L. Ed.
448 (1922); Western Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 255 U.S. 349, 41 S. Ct. 332,
65 L. Ed. 671 (1921); Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co. v. United States, 255 U.S.
339, 41 S. Ct. 329, 65 L. Ed. 667 (1921); United States v. Garlinger, 169 U.S. 316,
18 S. Ct. 364, 42 L. Ed. 762 (1898); Central Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 164
U.S. 93, 17 S. Ct. 35, 41 L. Ed. 362 (1896); Pray v. United States, 106 U.S. 594,
1 S. Ct. 483, 27 L. Ed. 265 (1883); Philadelphia & Balt. Cent. R. Co. v. United
States, 103 U.S. 703, 26 L. Ed. 454 (1881); United States v. Shrewsbury, 90 U.S.
(23 Wall.) 508, 23 L. Ed. 78 (1874).
71 271 U.S. 43, 46 S. Ct. 389, 70 L. Ed. 822 (1926).
72 271 U.S. 43 at 49, 46 S. Ct. 389, 70 L. Ed. 822 at 827.
78 111 U.S. 22, 4 S. Ct. 244, 28 L. Ed. 341 (1884).
74 111 U.S. 22 at 29, 4 S. Ct. 244, 28 L. Ed. 341 at 343.
75 70 Ct. Cl 334, particularly p. 353 (1930).
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RENEGOTIATION OF CONTRACTS
One of the most significant pieces of legislation having
to do with government contracts, produced during the pres-
ent emergency, is the Renegotiation of War Contracts
Law,76 passed to prevent repetition of the excessive profits
which were realized by contractors during and after the last
war.77 Following the Armistice in 1918, a great cry was
raised from one end of the country to the other against war
"profiteering." Between February, 1919, and April, 1942, ap-
proximately 170 bills and resolutions were offered in Con-
gress to eliminate excessive profits from war contracts, or,
to use the oft repeated phrase coined by the American Le-
gion, to "take the profits out of war." In 1934, the Vinson
Trammel Act 78 was passed which placed a limitation of
10% on the profits to be obtained from contracts for naval
vessels and naval aircraft. Prior to 1941, several other laws
had been placed on the statute books which limited the power
of the government to make purchases.79
These limitations were temporarily thrown into the dis-
card by the First War Powers Act s' which permitted the
President to authorize any department or agency of the gov-
ernment to enter into contracts without regard to the provi-
sions of the law relating to the making, performance, amend-
ment, or modification of contracts, subject, however, to the
limitation that the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of
contracts was forbidden. Effectiveness was given to the stat-
ute by Executive Order No. 9001,1 pursuant to which many
contracts were negotiated. Subsequently, Congress enacted
the Renegotiation of War Contracts Law. By reason of these
76 Act of April 28, 1942, c. 247, Title IV, § 403; 56 Stat. 245; 41 U.S.C.A., note
preceding § 1.
77 The Federal Trade Commission reported that in 1917 the profits gained by
salmon canneries, 80% of whose output was purchased by the government, aver-
aged 52% profit. The profit on the building of cruisers that year ranged from
25% to 27%. One steel company made a profit of 49% in 1916, 58% in 1917, and
46% in 1918. Other steel companies made between 30% and 320%. Profits in the
lumber industry based on capital investment ran as high as 121%, while in the
oil industry tney amounteci to 122%, and in sulphur were 236%.
78 48 Stat. 503; 34 U.S.C.A. § 494.
79 47 Stat. 1520, 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 10a, 10b, 10c; 52 Stat. 1196, 41 U.S.C.A. §48; 46
Stat. 392, 18 U.S.C.A. § 744g; 45 Stat. 1342, 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 7a-7d; 28 Stat. 622, 44
U.S.C.A. § 111; 34 Stat. 476; 39 U.S.C.A. § 355.
80 55 Stat. 838, 50 U.S.C.A. § 611.
81 50 U.S.C.A., following § 611.
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statutes, any department or agency may amend or modify
any war contract without regard to provisions of other stat-
utes to the contrary.
Certainly, where a contractor comes in voluntarily and
agrees with the government that his contract should be re-
negotiated and the price lowered, he has the right, and the
government has the power, to enter into such a modification.
Of that, there can be little question. Where the government
and the contractor sign a contract which contains a clause
providing for renegotiation and the time for such action ar-
rives, should the parties be so far apart in their figures that
agreement is impossible, a question will arise as to whether
or not the government can step in and arbitrarily say that
the contractor shall get so much and no more. An answer
would seem to be that, when the contractor signed the con-
tract it was understood by and between the parties that the
price designated in the contract was not the true price but
was only tentative, and subject to final adjustment down-
ward based upon experience, costs, production, skill, effici-
ency, and countless other factors. In such a situation, the
government as a sovereign power could not allow itself to
be precluded from what it considers to be a fair and equita-
ble price by the arbitrary stand or caprice of the auditing and
cost accounting departments of the contractor. Under the
provisions of the amendment of October 21, 1942, where an
agreement has been reached and signed by the parties, there
can be no further renegotiation of the contract by any de-
partment of the government and the agreement cannot be
disturbed. When such a provision was put into the law, it
certainly indicated that the intention of the government
was to be fair and equitable. When it directly provided that
there should be no harassment of contractors by repeated
renegotiation, cannot it be fairly assumed that the govern-
ment will see to it that a fair profit is realized on the part
of the contractor?
The statute may strike an attorney, at first blush, as ra-
ther peculiar in that there should be no yardstick in the law
for measuring "excessive profits." An attempt was made
by amendment to define that term, but it merely resulted
in a restatement of the two words. The policy of the govern-
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ment in not fixing a more definite standard is in line with a
general policy to rely on administrative wisdom and judg-
ment rather than on the words of a law. Those charged with
the duty of renegotiation must take a number of factors into
consideration which do not lend themselves to accurate
measurement, such as the past experiences of the contrac-
tor, profits on non-war contracts, profits on previous like
contracts, and others. It is left to the renegotiation board, in
the light of all the facts and circumstances that can be
brought to play on the situation, to determine what would
be a fair profit and what would, therefore, be regarded as
excessive. Because common sense must play a large part in
determining the answer to the question, there can be no fixed
standard of measurement. To have one which could be ap-
plied to all situations alike with any degree of fairness would
be an utter impossibility.
A more difficult problem is encountered when the gov-
ernment steps in and says that a contract shall be subject
to renegotiation whether or not it contains a renegotiation
clause. The question involves the problem of the govern-
ment repudiating the provisions of its own contracts with a
possible violation of the due process clause of the Constitu-
tion. In the first place, it must be remembered that the basic
renegotiation statute was not passed until April 28, 1942. In
the interim period between the attack on Pearl Harbor and
that date, the country had gone to war and a multiplicity of
essential contracts had been let. Corporations engaged in
normal civilian production turned their equipment over to
the war effort, but, totally inexperienced in the manufacture
of war products, they could only estimate costs as a matter
of conjecture. Speed was essential, so contracts had to be
made when it was utterly impossible for the parties to ar-
rive at a fair price. Why should the government then be
powerless to remedy a situation which was unavoidable?
Certainly one of the attributes of sovereignty is the power of
the government to protect itself, even in times of dire emer-
gency. When the United States makes a contract with an
individual, that contract becomes the property right of the
individual and, as such, receives the protection of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, but implicit therein is the
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fact that, by reason of the police or some other paramount
power, the government can alter, amend, or even repudiate
its contracts.8 2 While the war-time contracts remain execu-
tory they are, therefore, open to renegotiation. If fully execu-
ted and final payment has been made thereon prior to the
effective date of the statute, the status quo may not be dis-
turbed.
3
From this incomplete examination of the subject,
4 it
may be seen that the Federal Government has gone a long
way in yielding its position as a sovereign power in order to
meet contractors on equal terms. In the service of a nation
engaged in a war of unprecedented scale, it has called
upon its industrial leaders from coast to coast for hitherto
unheard of production. They have responded in a fashion
possible only in a democracy. It should be clear, then, that
the intent to be fair and equitable, on the part of government
and industry alike, is mutual.
APPENDIX I.
EXCERPT FROM PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS
Section 324 of the Procurement Regulations has the follow-
ing provision dealing with the termination of contracts for
the convenience of the government:
Every lump-sum supply contract regardless of subject matter, except:
(a) contracts to be completed in six months or less for an amount of
less than $500,000 and
(b) contracts for an amount less than $50,000 regardless of the date of
completion will contain an article without deviation as follows:
Article . . . Termination for the Convenience of the Government.
(a) The Government may, at any time, terminate this contract in whole
or in part by a notice in writing from the Contracting Officer to the
82 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 840, 78 L. Ed. 1434 (1934).
83 Act of April 28, 1942, c. 247, Title IV, § 403(c); 56 Stat. 245; 41 U.S.C.A., note
preceding § 1.
84 Many other aspects of the law of government contracts exist, but were not
included in this article by reason of editorial limitations on its length. To men-
tion but a few, some consideration is required of such statutes as the Walsh-Healy
Act, the Eight-Hour Law, the Bacon-Davis Act, the Kick-Back Act, the Buy Ameri-
can Act, the Miller Act, etc. In addition thereto is the problem of the cost-plus-
a-fixed fee type of contract with its subordinate problems of what is a fixed fee,
and what is a legitimate cost. These problems may be treated in a subsequent
article.
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Contractor that the contract is terminated under this Article. Such termi-
nation shall be effective in the manner and upon the date specified in said
notice and shall be without prejudice to any claims which the Government
may have against the Contractor, or any claims which the Contractor
may have against the Government. Upon receipt of such notice the Con-
tractor shall, except as the Contracting Officer directs otherwise, (1) dis-
continue all work and the placing of all orders for materials and facilities
in connection with the performance of this contract, cancel all existing
orders chargeable to this contract, and terminate all subcontracts charge-
able to this contract; (2) transfer to the Government, by delivery f.o.b.
..... or by such other means as the Contracting Officer may direct, title
to all completed supplies (including spare parts, drawings, information
and other things) called for herein, not previously delivered, and partially
completed supplies, work in process, materials, fabricated parts, plans,
drawings, and information acquired or produced by the Contractor for
the performance of this contract; and (3) take such action as may be
necessary to secure to the Government the benefits of any rights re-
maining in the Contractor under orders or subcontracts wholly or par-
tially chargeable to this contract to the extent that such orders or
subcontracts are chargeable. If and as the Contracting Officer so directs
or authorizes, the Contracting Officer shall sell at a price approved by
the Contracting Officer, or retain at a price mutually agreeable, any such
supplies, partially completed supplies, work in process, materials, fab-
ricated parts or other things. The proceeds of such sale or the agreed
price shall be paid or credited to the Government in such manner as the
Contracting Officer may direct so as to reduce the amount payable under
this Article.
(b) The Government shall, upon such termination of this contract, pay
to the Contractor the contract price of all supplies, (including spare parts,
drawings, information, and other things) called for herein which have
been completed in accordance with the provisions of this contract and
to which title has been received by the Government under the provisions
of Paragraph (a)(2) of this Article and for which payment has not
previously been made.
(c) In addition to, and without duplication of, the payments provided
for in paragraph (b) or of payments made prior to the termination of this
contract, the Government shall pay to the Contractor such sum as the
Contracting Officer and the Contractor may agree by Supplemental
Agreement is reasonably necessary to compensate the Contractor for his
costs, expenditures, liabilities, commitments, and work in respect to the
uncompleted portion of the contract so far as terminated by the notice
referred to in paragraph (a). The Contracting Officer shall include in
such sum such allowance for anticipated profit with respect to such un-
completed portion of the contract as is reasonable under all the circum-
stances.
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(d) If the Contracting Officer and the Contractor, within 90 days from
the effective date of the notice of termination referred to in paragraph (a)
or within such extended period as may be agreed upon between them,
cannot agree upon the sum payable under the provisions of paragraph
(c), the Government without duplication of any payment made pursuant
to paragraph (b) or prior to the termination of this contract, shall in the
above events compensate the Contractor for the uncompleted portion of
the contract as follows:
(1) By reimbursing the Contractor for all actual expenditures and costs
certified by the Contracting Officer as having been made or incurred with
respect to the uncompleted portion of the contract;
(2) By reimbursing, or providing for the payment or reimbursement of,
the Contractor for all expenditures made and costs incurred with the
prior written approval of the Contracting Officer in settling or discharging
that portion of the outstanding obligations or commitments of the Con-
tractor which had been incurred or entered into with respect to the
uncompleted portion of the contract; and
(3) By paying the Contractor, as a profit on the uncompleted portion of
the contract insofar as a profit is realized hereunder, a sum to be com-
puted by the Contracting Officer in the following manner:
(A) The Contracting Officer shall estimate the profit which would have
been realized on the uncompleted portion of the contract if the contract
had been completed and labor and material costs prevailing at the date
of termination had remained in effect.
(B) Estimate, from a consideration of all relevant factors, the per-
centage of completion of the uncompleted portion of the contract.
(C) Multiply the anticipated profit determined under (A) by the per-
centage determined under (B). The result is the amount to be paid to the
Contractor as a proportionate share of profit, if any, as above provided.
Notwithstanding the above provisions, no compensation shall be paid
under this Paragraph (d) by way of reimbursement for expenditure,
including expenditures made in settling or discharging obligations or
commitments, or by way of profit on account of supplies and other things
which are undeliverable because of destruction or damage, whether or
not because of the fault of the Contractor.
(e) The Government shall pay to the Contractor such sum as the Con-
tracting Officer and the Contractor may agree upon for expenditures
made and costs incurred with the approval of the Contracting Officer
(a) after the date of termination for the protection of Government prop-
erty, and (b) for such other expenditures and costs as may be necessary
in connection with the settlement of this contract, and in the absence of
such agreement as to the amount of such expenditures and costs shall
reimburse the Contractor for the same.
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(f) The obligation of the Government to make any of the payments
required by this Article shall be subject to any unsettled claim for labor
and material and to any claim which the Government may have against
the Contractor under or in connection with this contract, and payments
under this Article shall be subject to reasonable deductions by the Con-
tracting Officer on account of defects in the materials or workmanship
of completed or partially completed supplies delivered hereunder.
(g) The sum of all amounts payable under this Article, plus the sum of
all amounts previously paid under this contract, shall not exceed the total
contract price, adjusted in the event that this contract contains an article
providing for price adjustment, on the basis of the estimate of the Con-
tracting Officer, to the extent which would have been required by such
article if this contract had been completed and labor and materials costs
prevailing at the date of termination had remained in effect.
(h) Should the above provisions of this Article not result in payment to
the Contractor of at least $100.00, then that amount shall be paid to the
Contractor in lieu of any and all payments hereinbefore provided for in
this Article.
(i) The Government shall promptly make partial payments to the
Contractor:
(1) on account of the amounts due under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d)
of this Article to the extent that, in the judgment of the Contracting
Officer, such payments are clearly within the amounts due under such
paragraphs, and
(2) of such amounts as the Contracting Officer may direct, on account
of proposed settlements of outstanding obligations or commitments, to
be made by the Contractor pursuant to paragraph (d) (2) of this
Article, if such settlements shall have been approved by the Contracting
Officer and subject to such provisions for escrow or direct payment to
the persons entitled to receive such settlement payments as the Con-
tracting Officer may require.
(j) Any dispute arising out of termination under this Article shall be
decided in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article 12 of this
Contract.
(k) Upon the making of payments called for by this Article, all obliga-
tions of the Government to make further payments or to carry out other
undertakings hereunder shall cease forthwith and forever, except that all
rights and obligations of the respective parties under the Articles, if any,
of this contract applicable to patent infringements and reproduction
rights shall remain in full force and effect.
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(1) The Government shall terminate this contract only in accordance
with this Article, except as otherwise provided by law, or by Article . . .
(Delays-Damages). Notwithstanding Article . . . (Delays-Damages) and
any defaults of the Contractor, the government shall terminate this con-
tract only in accordance with this Article if such termination is simul-
taneous with or part of or in connection with a general termination of
war contracts at, about the time of, or following the cessation of the
present hostilities or the end of the present war, unless the Contracting
Officer finds that the defaults of the Contractor (1) have been gross or
wilful and (2) have caused substantial damage to the Government.
